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The Originalism That Was, and the One 
That Will Be 
Michael S. Greve* 
INTRODUCTION 
The original title for the conference talk on which this brief article is 
based, hand-picked by the excellent Jack Balkin, was, “What Was 
Originalism.” While characteristically clever and provocative, the 
suggestion of originalism’s death captures my position only imperfectly. I 
believe that originalism—in a broad, generic sense, encompassing any 
belief that the text is the baseline and that its authors’ expectations count 
for something—will become more orthodox than ever. And, like many 
participants at Jack’s wonderful conference, I suspect that his Living 
Originalism1 will hasten that trend: already, originalism’s conservative 
sentinels have predictably attempted to pocket the “originalism” part and 
to dismiss the “living” elements.2 However, a certain kind of conservative 
originalism, or perhaps several positions in originalism’s “logical space,”3 
has or have become unsustainable—partly for theoretical, academic 
reasons, but in much larger part on account of changes in the broader 
political context in which originalism operates. Originalism will live, but 
its dominant forms will have a different tone and orientation. 
The originalism that in my estimation has outlived its usefulness has 
three central, interrelated features. First, it is Court-centered and 
preoccupied with legal interpretation. Second, it is positivist: judges must 
follow the constitutional rules because they are what they are and because 
the 1788 sovereign said so; any talk about why he, or we, or she the 
people said so is for interpretive purposes off limits. And third, it is 
clause-bound and rights-focused: its principal focus is to cabin the judicial 
 
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
1. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
2. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 663 (2009). 
3. See Mitchell Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9-16 (2009) (finding “at 
least” seventy-two positions in originalism’s “logical space,” and arguing that originalism has several 
dimensions, which define the space). 
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interpretation of open-ended constitutional provisions from due process to 
cruel and unusual punishment. Because those traits have characterized the 
dominant forms of originalism over the past generation, I will call this 
form of originalism “conventional” originalism. 
However, Court-centeredness, positivism, and clause-boundedness are 
neither necessary nor even compelling features of a plausible originalist 
jurisprudence. Conventional originalism owes them largely to the 
circumstances of its historical origin and its intended political function as 
a bulwark against the Warren-Brennan Court’s “activism.” For a host of 
reasons and in many important respects, the political and intellectual 
context has changed, and originalism is bound to adjust accordingly. In 
fact, that process is well underway. 
I. THEORY 
As an initial matter, there are sound theoretical reasons to jettison 
originalist commitments to Court-centeredness, positivism, and rights-
focused clause-boundedness. Taking the features in order: “Court-
centeredness”—that is, the notion that Supreme Court decisions and 
opinions constitute, by and large, the sum and substance of constitutional 
discourse—was a principal target of Bruce Ackerman’s We the People lo 
these many years ago,4 and it is fair to say that Ackerman has won this 
debate hands down. One need not embrace Ackerman’s idiosyncratic 
account of informal, extra-textual constitutional amendments, nor even 
the “democratic constitutionalism” that resonates in Balkin’s theory, to 
recognize that constitutional development has been shaped, powerfully 
and legitimately, by forces outside the Court; or to acknowledge that the 
universe of intelligent and intelligible constitutional debate is much wider 
than the subfield of judicial interpretation. Much non- or anti-progressive 
scholarship in recent years has recognized and emphasized these points. 
Some contributions in this vein have an institutional bent; Keith 
Whittington’s Constitutional Construction is an example.5 Other 
accounts, including my own, emphasize the Constitution’s political 
economy.6 And a leading constitutional casebook, authored by prominent 
originalists, is heavy on high-level constitutional theory and 
comparatively light on constitutional case law.7 
 
4. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); see also Jack M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 964, 1002-03 (1998) 
(criticizing the clause-boundedness of constitutional law teaching). 
5. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (2001). 
6. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (2012). 
7. See MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, STEVEN G. CALABRESI, MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL & 
SAMUEL L. BRAY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: TEXT, STRUCTURE, HISTORY, AND 
2
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Conventional originalism’s positivist streak has suffered a similar fate. 
We must stick to the text and nothing but the text, say originalists 
committed to this position, because the sovereign said so two-hundred-
plus years ago and because otherwise judges will start making things up. 
However, as Michael McConnell notes,8 textual interpretation can get you 
only so far. Insist that there is no law and only politics beyond the text, 
and it becomes very difficult to articulate a coherent account of well-
accepted and irreversible constitutional developments. The test case, 
because the debate is still alive, is the New Deal;9 but the difficulty is 
much more fundamental. Never mind Marbury v. Madison,10 which 
invites “it’s all politics” teaching: you could teach McCulloch v. 
Maryland11 and Gibbons v. Ogden12 and Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward13 that way, too. And if you are an originalist Justice, you can 
opine and rule that way.14 You might even have a point. But it is not a 
persuasive point. 
More important perhaps is a point that Balkin tees up and then, as I see 
it, whiffs. Conventional originalism, he says, can never celebrate great 
constitutional innovations like Brown v. Board of Education;15 it can only 
explain them away, grudgingly accept them, or modify its jurisprudential 
commitments to accommodate them.16 Maybe. But then, conventional 
originalism doesn’t have to apologize for such masterpieces of “living” 
originalism as Dred Scott17 or Roe v. Wade.18 That, I should have thought, 
is the point. Conventional originalism’s defect is more fundamental: it 
cannot explain what’s so great about constitutionalism and the 
Constitution in the first place. It wants to be parasitic on what Bruce 
Ackerman calls “dualism”19—that is to say, our contractarian 
constitutional tradition: the Constitution in its original public meaning 
warrants respect because it was ordained by the democratic sovereign and 
 
PRECEDENT (2010). In particular, see the authors’ Preface at v. 
8. Michael W. McConnell, Richard and Frances Mallery Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, 
Originalism and Precedent: Panel Presentation at the Constitutional Interpretation and Change 
Conference at Yale Law School (Apr. 27, 2012). 
9. See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231 (1994) (arguing that New Deal institutions and doctrines are irreconcilable with originalism). 
10. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
12. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
14. See GREVE, supra note 6, at 371-72 (arguing that contemporary originalist opinions 
effectively repudiate Gibbons). 
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
16. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 116-19. 
17. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
19. ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 3-33. 
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because that sovereign did so ordain. However, conventional originalism 
does not want to defend the contractarian tradition (let alone respond to 
those who attack it), for fear that the enterprise might pull judges away 
from a readable text into natural law abstractions and aspirations. In the 
words of a justly famous jurist, though, “we must never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding,”20 and that cannot be done without 
(among other things) some account of what the instrument is supposed to 
do. That account, in turn, requires a theory of politics—a theory of 
constitutional politics, and a theory of “normal” (or, as public choice 
theorists say, “in-period”) politics. And at the end of the day, that two-part 
theory has to be a normative theory, albeit one that must remain closely 
tied to constitutional text, structure, and historical understanding. 
Finally, clause-boundedness and rights-focus. Conventional 
originalism’s paradigm of constitutional practice is a case in which 
judicial interpretation meets the raw, unmediated text of a specific 
constitutional clause. However, this is a very impoverished account of 
judicial practice at least in constitutional adjudication, where courts and 
lawyers meet the pure text only once in a blue moon. District of Columbia 
v. Heller21 (and McDonald v. City of Chicago22 after it) is that rare case—
which explains why it has prompted a torrent of blog and law review 
commentary, mostly of a methodological, interpretive bent and wholly out 
of proportion to the practical interest and significance of the case. The 
common move of enriching originalism with a theory of precedent does 
not help the situation very much. Wholly apart from the familiar 
difficulties (does a well-accepted but non-originalist precedent dominate 
the text, or is it the other way around?), judicial practice and Supreme 
Court practice in particular isn’t really dominated by either text or 
precedent but by doctrine—that is, the reasoning that makes text and 
precedent hang together. 
In a contemporary and comparative context, clause-boundedness seems 
to be a peculiar feature of American constitutional practice.23 However, 
this uniqueness is a product of modern-day originalism, not of an 
“exceptional” American constitutional tradition. Go read cases from the 
nineteenth century, when everyone was an originalist: they are not clause-
bound. For example, contemporary readers will often find it difficult to 
tell whether this or that case was decided “under” Swift v. Tyson24 or 
 
20. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). 
21. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
22. 561 U.S. 3025 (2010). 
23. Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, Jack Balkin Is an American, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 23 (2013). 
24. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
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“under” the Contract Clause;25 or whether this or that turn-of-the-
twentieth century case was “a due process case” or “a dormant Commerce 
Clause case.” (Both doctrines then embodied the general understanding 
that states must not extend their jurisdiction beyond their borders.26) The 
“what clause” question misses the point: nineteenth-century jurists were 
not terribly concerned with putting cases into boxes. To their minds, the 
individual clauses and doctrines all hung together in the constitutional 
architecture and its bedrock principles. Some contemporary originalist 
accounts reflect a similar, structural understanding. Akhil Amar’s account 
of The Bill of Rights as a Constitution is an example;27 Michael 
McConnell’s take on the Contract Clause is another.28 Nor do I believe 
that anything in Balkin’s originalism commits him to clause-boundedness. 
If anything, his “framework originalism” cuts against that conventional-
originalist orientation. 
To rephrase and press the point a bit further: a deliberately minimalist 
constitution like the United States’ Constitution invites and indeed 
requires—to employ the fighting words—a common law 
constitutionalism. This is illustrated even by rare, text-and-history-only 
rights cases like Heller and McDonald: if you want to operationalize the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms, you need a federal common law 
of gun possession.29 And what is true of rights is even truer of the 
constitutional structure: it needs construction and doctrine. There is no 
other way to make the Constitution work. 
Politics, constitutional theory, common law construction: all this sounds 
very open-ended, very “Yale.” And, in fact, there is no gainsaying the 
very real danger that a constitutional understanding that makes room for 
those modes of argument and reasoning also creates breathing space for a 
nominal originalism in which the text disappears and just about anything 
goes. To no one’s great surprise, I am inclined to think that Balkin’s 
“living” originalism illustrates the peril. It brings to mind Lon L. Fuller’s 
account of a famous riddle in Wittgenstein’s Investigations. To wit, a 
mother of small children tells the babysitter, “While I’m gone, teach my 
children a game.” When the mother returns, the kids have learned to duel 
with kitchen knives and to shoot dice for money. The question is whether 
 
25. E.g., Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. 134 (1847). The case can be read either way. 
26. See, e.g., Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Pullman v. Kansas, 
216 U.S. 56 (1910). 
27. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). 
28. Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the 
Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267 
(1988). 
29. J. Harvey Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 253, 279-88 (2009). This, it seems to me, is the rational core of Judge Wilkinson’s emphatic 
critique of Heller. 
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the mother would be entitled to say, “That is not what I meant,” even if 
those particular infractions had never occurred to her.30 Living originalism 
does not engage this type of “c’mon, now” problem; and in fact, it is not 
meant to engage it. What living originalism says instead is, “Babysitters 
of the world unite! Let’s start a social movement and invent some more 
games.” This is what it means in Balkin’s universe to move “off-the-wall” 
propositions and causes “on the wall,”31 and it is playing with a stacked 
deck. Mom is no longer around to object that she did not mean knife 
fights and dice; and in any event, framework originalism pretty much 
discards objections arising from “original expected applications.”32 In so 
doing, critics might claim, Balkin sleights a central purpose of 
constitutionalism—the purpose of keeping stuff off the wall even if you 
cannot exactly envision what future generations might think of. 
Again, I am inclined to agree with this criticism, though I hasten to add 
that the drive-by critique just sketched for expositional purposes hardly 
does justice to Balkin’s subtle position. In the present context, however, 
the more salient observation is that constitutional and common law 
construction, done right, is actually quite constricting—in some forms, 
arguably more constricting than conventional originalism. For example, 
the hoary Marbury v. Madison notion that every clause in the Constitution 
must be given force and independent meaning33 is a tenet of conventional 
originalism (as preached, though not as practiced by Justices);34 it gains 
additional and special force against the backdrop presumption that each 
clause is part of an architecture whose coherence and logic merit respect. 
For another example, conventional originalism would roundly deny that 
the Constitution contains a “right to education.”35 A deeper, structural 
originalism might hold that even if a right to education were adopted by 
 
30. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 138-39 (rev. ed. 1969). Wittgenstein’s original, less 
colorful riddle can be found in LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 38 (P.M.S. 
Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., rev. 4th ed. 2009).  
31. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 17-18. The limit to this “constitutional” dynamic, to the extent that I 
can determine it, is the assurance that most crackpot and off-the-wall arguments “go nowhere.” Id. at 
18. Knives and dice, then. But not plastic explosives, maybe: the kids weren’t interested. 
32. “Original expected applications,” Balkin says, can serve as a “resource” and help us discover 
“permissible constructions.” Id. at 258. “Permissible,” however, seems to be just about anything the 
text can (barely) bear, and “[w]e use history to see whether the issues or problems that concerned the 
framing generation are structurally or analogically similar to the ones we face today.” Id. at 267. That, 
it seems to me, is not a very restrictive limiting principle. 
33. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any 
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”). 
34. For examples and discussion, see GREVE, supra note 6, at 298-302 (discussing wholesale 
evisceration of the Compact Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3). See also id. at 305-06 (discussing 
the idea that the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, is unenforceable with respect 
to public acts). 
35. Cf. Sara Aronchick Solow & Barry Friedman, How To Talk About the Constitution, 25 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 69 (2013). 
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formal Article V amendment, it would have to be repealed—much like 
the Eighteenth Amendment was eventually explicitly repealed, in 
recognition of the fact that it never belonged in the Constitution in the 
first place.36 For yet another example, conventional originalism has 
embraced a wide range of federalism doctrines that spring from the notion 
of a constitutionally mandated “balance” between Washington and the 
states. As I have tried to show at painful length, that supposed principle is 
completely made up, and it has led conventional originalists to engineer 
doctrines that are antithetical to the Constitution’s logic and structure.37 
One can, I think, recover the actual constitutional structure—but only by 
abandoning conventional originalist (and especially clause-bound) 
pretensions and by starting with the premise that there actually is a 
structure and logic to discover. 
II. POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Conventional (Court-centered, positivist, clause-bound) originalism, I 
have suggested, owes its debilities to its historical origins and its intended 
political function.38 First, originalism arose as a conservative response to 
what two wags (and superb lawyers) have called “Marxist-
Brennanism”—that is, “that pulsating, action-inspiring, elitist dream of 
socialist utopia brought about not by the blood and rubble of proletarian 
revolt but by the sophistry and assurances of a bloodless, velvet, judicial 
usurpation.”39 Deference would not do as a response: Alexander Bickel 
(and, on the bench, Felix Frankfurter) had articulated that position for 
decades, and it had failed to work.40 So there had to be a more ambitious 
theory. Second, originalism had to unite conservatives under a common 
banner (and behind a common commitment that could find assent among 
a wide, somewhat unwieldy array of constituencies and causes). And 
third, originalism had to tie legal and constitutional concerns to a broader 
conservative agenda. 
What is originalism’s record, in a practical-political frame of reference? 
 
36. For an argument to this effect, see Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. Parrish, Structural 
Constitutional Principles and Rights Reconciliation, in CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICA AND EUROPE: 
BEYOND THE NATION-STATE? 206, 213-14 (Michael S. Greve & Michael Zöller eds., 2009). 
37. GREVE, supra note 6. 
38. Id. For a more extended discussion, see Michael S. Greve, Conservatives and the Courts, in 
CRISIS OF CONSERVATISM? THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS AFTER BUSH 237 (Joel Aberbach & Gillian Peele eds., 2011). In the text below, 
I will often drop the cumbersome “conventional” qualifier. Unless otherwise indicated, however, I 
have that originalism in mind. 
39.  Gasaway & Parrish, supra note 36, at 211. 
40. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS (1978). 
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In the first dimension, originalism has manifestly failed to stem the flow 
of postmodern “mystery” rights.41 (Some of the political implications are 
noted below.) In the second dimension, it has succeeded spectacularly, 
quite probably beyond its originators’ wildest imagination: even Balkin is 
an originalist now. Of course, there is some cost to an originalism that is 
sufficiently latitudinarian to embrace folks with a wide range of 
conflicting political agendas, just as there is a cost to the fact that a 
Supreme Court nominee, in recognition of originalism’s public 
orthodoxy, can switch from “wise Latina” to judicial “umpire” without 
missing a beat, let alone her appointment.42 On the whole, however, 
conservatives would rather have that fight than a fight over equality or 
decency or aspirations in the abstract. Conventional originalism’s true 
problem, it seems to me, is the third dimension: it has become 
disconnected from politics and from conservative politics in particular. 
Four quick-and-dirty observations illustrate the point. 
First, originalism was self-consciously and deliberately formulated as a 
democratic originalism or democratic formalism. Judicial adherence to 
text and forms, its proponents argued, would allow democratic politics to 
operate where it ought to.43 So understood, originalism hung together with 
a Reaganesque anti-elite story: once the righteous American people are 
entitled again to govern themselves, they will no longer be governed by 
effete elites from Harvard and Yale; by the Supreme Court and by the 
New York Times. Manifestly, that story has failed to pan out. Of course, 
the Court’s role in the “culture war” domains has mobilized and 
consumed a great deal of energy on all sides. However, the demos at large 
has shown little interest in governing itself. Perhaps the public has proven 
indifferent to appeals to democracy because the Court has remained 
broadly responsive to “The Will of the People.”44 Or perhaps, the ready 
acceptance of “juristocracy”45 signals that conventional originalism makes 
too much of a supposed dichotomy between democratic government and 
(soft, benign) tyranny and altogether too little of the fact that so much of 
 
41. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citing 
and quoting Casey’s “mystery” passage with approval). 
42. See, e.g., Robert Barnes & Paul Kane, Sotomayor Repudiates “Wise Latina” Comment, 
BOSTON.COM (July 15, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/07/15 
/sotomayor_backs_off_wise_latina_quote. 
43. For a fair-minded discussion and critique, see Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic 
Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529 (1997). 
44. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009) 
(arguing that, throughout American history, the Supreme Court has remained in sync with broad 
currents of public opinion). 
45. The likely origin of the term is RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY (2004). 
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our lives is already dominated by institutions with a highly attenuated 
democratic pedigree. The Federal Reserve has decimated old folks’ 
retirement accounts, the better to lend to Congress at effectively zero 
interest. Government-sponsored enterprises dominate the markets for 
housing and student loans, to the point where it has become hard to find a 
security in the United States that is not issued or backstopped one way or 
another by the U.S. government. Federal agencies have re-engineered 
products from toilet tanks to light bulbs and shower heads, to the point 
where some of us might want the government out of their bathrooms and 
back into the bedroom, where it belongs.46 All this has happened without 
a very plausible or direct democratic warrant—yet with a lot more direct 
effect on citizens’ lives than a stranger’s abortion or a gay union down the 
street, and without effective complaint about or challenge to public 
authority. The public response has been constant and in its own way 
rational: we are okay with the rules regardless of their progeny, provided 
they do not require any serious behavioral change on our part.47 
The second, related way in which conventional originalism has become 
disconnected from politics has to do with the outcome of the culture wars. 
It would be too much to say that those wars are behind us. Even and 
especially as “evolving standards of decency”48 have converged on 
postmodern morality as the governing public and constitutional norm, 
there remains the question of whether dissenters will still be permitted to 
have it their way—for example, by refusing to cover contraceptives and 
abortion under their health care plans49 or by refusing to rent their homes 
to gay couples.50 Liberals may well insist that (mostly religious) 
arguments that are patently impermissible in a fight over a public norm 
(for example, gay marriage) cannot then serve as a defense for a private 
exemption from that norm. Race is the paradigm of constitutional politics, 
and no quarter may be given until the Catholic Church suffers the fate of 
the Klan. To the extent liberalism pursues this course, and to the extent 
that religious constituencies are more resilient and self-confident than 
racist crackpots, the fight will go on and may even become harsher. 
However, it is not a distinctly originalist fight. Originalism insisted that 
the public norms themselves should be left to democratic judgment, and 
 
46. I owe the joke to Kate O’Beirne. 
47. On public agencies’ inability to engineer behavioral change, see Christopher C. DeMuth, 
Unintended Consequences and Intended Non-Consequences, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (June 8, 2009), 
http://www.christopherdemuth.com/unintended-consequences-and-intended-non-consequences.html. 
48. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
49. See, e.g., Editorial, The Politics of Religion, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/opinion/the-politics-of-religion.html?ref=contraception. 
50. See, e.g., Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, Diane Cervelli and Taeko Bufford, Gay Couple, Sues 
Hawaiian B&B for Discrimination, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2011/12/19/diane-cervelli-taeko-bufford-lawsuit_n_1159190.html. 
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that fight is over. In this important respect, conventional originalism can 
no longer engage cultural conservatives. 
Third, conventional originalism has little to offer to constituencies that 
are worried about government overreach and abuse and, more broadly, the 
fate of the country’s economic order. Those constituencies include 
libertarians who agitate and litigate against licensing laws and eminent 
domain abuses: Their slogan is judicial “engagement,” not “restraint.”51 
They want an originalism of rights, not of interest group democracy. Far 
more importantly, “more democracy” is not a plausible answer to the 
business community or perhaps more precisely, the diminishing number 
of business firms and organizations that have not yet resigned themselves 
to crony capitalism and to a life as regulated utilities. For example, the 
Chamber of Commerce is not terribly enamored with Justice Thomas’s or 
Justice Scalia’s ostentatiously originalist positions on the dormant 
Commerce Clause or federal preemption, which all too often commit 
interstate commerce to the tender care of Congress.52 An originalism of 
this description threatens to split business constituencies from the rest of 
the conservative camp. Neither originalism nor conservatism can afford 
that result. 
These brief observations converge on the fourth and to my mind most 
fundamental reason why originalism will be reformulated: democratic 
politics itself has lost its allure. “Make room for democratic politics” was 
a very plausible program in the Reagan era. The institutions would or 
could be made to work, conservatives thought, and social conservatives, 
free-marketeers, and businesses would all get their way. But that was 
then, and this is now. The crucial difference, it seems to me, is not that 
democratic politics hasn’t quite yielded the results that conservatives 
expected: that possibility always came with the territory. The difference, 
rather, is that confidence in politics requires confidence both in the 
American people and in government institutions; and on both counts, the 
confidence has been very badly shaken. In conservatives’ minds, the 
American people may still be more sensible and virtuous than the corrupt 
elites. Still, the demos appears to insist both on a really big transfer state 
and on not paying for it, and that disposition has brought the country to 
the edge of a financial abyss. Likewise, the notion that our public, 
democratic institutions might be capable of restoring a sensible political, 
legal, and economic order—if only we elect the “right” representatives—
 
51. See Principles of Judicial Engagement, INST. FOR JUSTICE CENTER FOR JUDICIAL 
ENGAGEMENT, http://www.ij.org/cje/facts. 
52. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Cuomo v. Clearinghouse Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009); Wyeth v. 
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1205 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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has become very doubtful: the institutions look dysfunctional, regardless 
of who happens to occupy them. In both respects, conservatives harbor 
fears that are probably shared by large majorities of voters, except 
perhaps more so. In that environment, an après nous le deluge originalism 
that has nothing to say for itself or to anyone than “more democracy” is 
politically useless. It may live on in academic enclaves, but not in public 
debate and politics. 
CONCLUSION 
For conservatives, the present political constellation neither heralds nor 
requires an originalism that would have an imperial Supreme Court 
resurrect a pre-New Deal “Constitution in Exile.”53 What it does require is 
a jurisprudence that is coherent with the demands of conservative politics; 
resonant with public sentiments; and above all responsive to pressing 
problems—not the clatter and confusion of our daily politics, but the 
present-day manifestations of institutional dysfunctions that the Founders 
recognized and sought to redress. Originalism—broadly defined and 
understood as a form and expression of elite politics—has always 
reflected those sorts of forces and considerations; in Steven Teles’s able 
telling, that nimbleness has a great deal to do with originalism’s rise from 
quaint obsession to near-orthodoxy.54 If that pattern holds, conventional 
originalism will be driven out by an originalism that gives a confident, 
positive account of the structure of the Constitution and its intended 
purpose of disciplining a wayward politics. 
To the considerable extent that we are all originalists now, it is between 
Balkin’s constitutional babysitters and the adults. Unlike another round of 
squabbles over eighteenth-century dictionary definitions, this brawl 
actually makes sense; and there isn’t a more fun, erudite, and generous 
guy to have it with than my friend Jack Balkin. 
 
 
53. But see Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 17, 2005, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/17/magazine/17CONSTITUTION.html?_r=1; Jeffrey 
Rosen, How New Is the New Textualism?, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 43 (2013) (describing the 
powerful “Constitution in Exile movement” to overthrow the New Deal by judicial edict—a cabal of 
which this author is allegedly a ringleader). Rosen’s articles answer themselves: a movement that has 
me as a leader is already in very big trouble. For more extended responses, see Orin Kerr, Is “the 
Constitution in Exile” a Myth?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 29, 2004, 12:57 PM), http:// 
www.volokh.com/posts/1104346631.shtml; and Michael S. Greve, A Conspiracy So Vast, LIBRARY 
OF LAW & LIBERTY (May 10, 2012), http://libertylawsite.org/2012/05/10/a-conspiracy-so-vast. 
54. See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE 
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008) (describing strategic adjustments of conservative legal 
organizations, such as the Federalist Society and public interest law firms, in response to changing 
opportunities and in light of experience with unsuccessful or obsolete modes of operation). 
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